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1. SUMMARY: The question in this case is whether 




Article III court and, if so, whether 23 D.C. Code§ llO(g) 
is constitutional. 
2. FACTS: The &,_overnment seeks review, in a single 
petition, of two cases. Each respondent filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court 
for the District of Columbia, seeking to review his criminal 
conviction in local District of Columbia courts for violation 
of the District of Columbia code. Each raised constitutional 
issues Palmore a Fourth Amendment claim and Pressley an 
effective assistance of counsel claim. Each claim had --
according to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals -- previously 
been fully litigated and decided by the local D.C. Superior 
Court. The government moved to dismiss the petitions on the 
ground that jurisdiction to consider the claims was removed 
by 23 D.C. Code§ llO(g). It provides: 
"An application for a writ of 
habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner 
who is authorized to apply for relief 
by motion pursuant to this section 
shall not be entertained by the 
I 
Superior Court or by any Federal or 
. State court iffit appears that the 
applicant has ailed to make a motion 
for relief under this section .QJ.:_:tha..t. 
th~L~h.1perj.or __ C(?u~t has denied him re-
lief, unless it also appears that the 
remedy by motion is inadequate or in-
effective to test the legality of his 
detention." ( r ... ,.k .; ):~ a ,ldt.-1) 
In each case the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. 
The Court of Appeals,~ bane, reversed over one dissent. 
• 
- 3 -
That court held that§ llO(g) was simply an 
exhaustion statute, requiring that a prisoner not present 
a claim by way of habeas corpus until he had first pre-
sented the claim to the local District of Columbia courts. 
In so holding, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals simply 
read out of the statute the words "or that the Superior 
Court has denied him relief." It did so because it thought -
that otherwise serious constitutional questions would be 
raised under the no suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
clause and the equal protection (due process) clause. The 
problems seemed to be that the Suspension Clause can 
plausibly be construed to prevent Congress from denying 
access to an Article III court in which to 'ti_11aterali:Yi attackJ 
a criminal conviction; and that the equal protection clause 
might, in any event, prevent Congress from providing access 
to an Article III court to every convicted prisoner in the 
country, except those convicted in the local District of 
Columbia courts. The court was not really able to find anything 
in the congressional purpose to support its result, exs_gpt that 
it could not believe Congress would deliberately create such 
.__ ________________ ;;,..._ ___________ ,___ -
serious constitutional problems. It concluded, therefore, that ---------~ ~~ --the statute was designed to make the situation in the District 
of Columbia parallel the situation in the states -- availability 





3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the statute 
means what it says. The statute tracks almost word for --------word 28 U.S.C. § 2255 -- which provides for collateral 
relief only before the same court before which the original 
trial took place. The SG says that the D.C. Circuit's 
holding is for all intents and purposes a constitutional 
holding masquerading as statutory construction. The SG says 
that the D.C. Circuit's "statutory" holding is wrong and 
should be reversed. I am not entirely clear whether the SG 
wants us to remand for a "constitutional" decision or whether 
he wants us to decide the constitutional question. As I read 
his petition, it is the latter which he wants. 
The SG does not discuss the merits of the constitutional 
issue in the petition. He just says it is an important question. 
Presumably he agrees with Judge Robb who dissented below --
. -
reaching the constitutional issue. He said that the writ of 
habeas corpus is not suspended by this statute -- it simply is 
made available only in courts manned by judges without life 
tenure. There is no equal protection problem. Collateral relief 
is available only in the court system in which the original con-
viction was obtained -- except where the original conviction was 
in state court or courts martial. Congress could rationally 
conclude that in those instances the original court system was 
more suspect than are the local District of Columbia courts, 





4. DISCUSSION: It seems to me that the SG is 
right on the statutory construction issue. I would think 
that the judgment below is wrong enough on that issue so 
that cert should be granted. If it is, I would also guess 
that the constitutional issue would not be reached; but 
that the case would be remanded for a decision on that issue 
• jf\ ·H_t ./:-~:,.; •I ~( 1pr,c L· 
-- foregone though the conclusion on that issue may- b~\-----=---:...:_. 
Possibly, however, this Court might agree with the SG that 
the District of Columbia Circuit has in effect decided the 
constitutional issue and cert could be granted to resolve it 
here. The suspension clause issue seems hard to me. The 
Court has always avoided it in the past. Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 1. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 
U.S. 86, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903); United States v. 
Jung Ah Lung. 124 U.S. 621, 8 S.Ct. 663, 31 L.Ed. 591 (1888). 
See also Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 28 S.Ct. 201, 
52 L.Ed. 369 (1908). The "equal protection" argument made by 
resps seems weak. 
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Blackmun, J ................. . 
~ - .. i. '1 ....... /,,,.~. -~ .. ~-.................. . 
MarsB.all, J ............ . 
White, J ............... . 
Stewart, J . ......... ... . 
Brennan, J ............. . 
✓ ·1· .., ....... .. 
. ·--✓ ····••"· 
Burger, C'h. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
October 8, 1976 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 4 
No. 75-811 
..,, .S"c;.. 
Motion to Vacate and Remand 
" SUPERIOR GOUR T OF 
DIST. OF COLUMBIA 
v. 
~ ~p~ ~ -----
t:>f~,1~~~ ' 
k S-6-~ ~ 
. '- .. ?~ -'-~~ / 
PALMORE {f/--~~..J ~ t4,e • .& ~ 1-:--" 
4',,,~~G-ts. ~lf-1~ , ~..,~~)...,._,dA,~~ 
SUMMAR Y : On February 23, the Court granted cert to CADC to review 
two separate~ bane judgments presenting the single question whether 23 
Code §ll0(g) renders federal habeas relief una.va-Hable o pe r sons incarcerated 
pursuant to convic iorrs-i~ . Ct. and, if so, whether §ll0(g) is constitu-
This is the ?G's motion to vacate and remand in light of No. 74-1055, 
Powell, as to the judgment in Palmore only. (In the companion case, 
Swain v. Pressley, resp prisoner sought collateral relief in USDC (D. C.) on 
Sixth Amendment grounds; resp Palmore' s habeas petn presented a Fourth 




CONTENTIONS OF THE SG: The SG points out that Palmore' s search 
and seizure claim was considered and rejected by the trial court and on appeal 
to DCCA. [This Court granted plenary review to consider Palmore' s contention 
that he was entitled to be tried by an Art. III judge on the charge of committing 
a felony in violation of the D. C. Code. The Court affirmed, Palmore v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973 ); in fn. 6 at 397, the Court expressly noted its "denial 
of the writ (of cert) with respect to (Palmore's) Fourth Amendment claim. 11] In 
the federal habeas action, the DC dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, but the CA 
reversed and remanded for a determination on the merits. 
The SG, noting the above history and implicitly treating Palmore as a 
"state prisoner, 11 argues that, in light of Stone v. Powell, Palmore would not be 
entitled to the relief he seeks below regardless of the determination of this Court 
on the jurisdictional question before it. The SG suggests that the Court remand 
Palmore to CADC for consideration of the disposition of Palmore' s habeas petn 
in light of Stone. 
DISCUSSION: Assuming that Stone v. Powell is applicable to federal habeas 
proceedings initiated prior to the date of decision, that case does not operate as a 
jurisdictional bar to relief. Presumably, if the Court affirms in the instant case, 
PalP1.ore would have the opportunity in DC to refute the claim that his Fourth 
Amendment contention was fully and fairly reviewed on direct appeal or to make 
whatever argument available to him to except his case from the Stone holding. The 
practical question presented by Palmore's cert petn is whether or not he will get 
---. ,,.....,.__-----, ~ ...... ..,..., rf - ~




There is no response. 
Goltz 
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PALMORE 
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r a conversation with Mr. Rodak, I asked that 
Superior Court v. Palmore, be relisted for 
y conference. 
" , . 
.. , 
\ 




>FFICE OF THE ASSOCIATE DEAN 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001 
October 13, 1976 
Michael Rodak, Jr., Esquire 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Superior Court of the District of Columbia 
v. Roosevelt F. Palmore, No. 75-811. 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
Enclosed is the formal letter outlining our position with 
regard to the pending motion to vacate and remand in Superior 
Court v. Palmore, No. 75-811. While I did not think it was 
appropriate to include a further fact in a formal statement of 
position, I wanted you to know that I was confined in bed with 
hepatitis during almost the entire month of September. For 
that reason, I was unable to file a formal response to the 
Government's motion in a timely fashion. I sincerely regret 
any inconvenience to you or to the Court which the absence of 
such a response may h}l-ve caused. 
With appreciation for your consideration and courtesy, 
I am, 




GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001 
OFFICE OF THE ASSOCIATE DEAN October 13, 1976 
J 
Michael Rodak, Jr., Esquire 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Superior Court of the District of Columbia 
v. Roosevelt F. Palmore, No. 75-811. 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
Confirming our earlier telephone conversations, this is 
to advise you that respondent ("Palmore ") will not oppose the 
pending motion filed by the Solicitor General to vacate the 
judgment and remand this case to the United States Court of 
Appeals for further consideration in light of Stone v. Powell, 
_U.S . (1976). 
Palmore's application for a writ of habeas corpus alleged 
violations of Fourth. Amendment rights and nece~sarily brought 
into consideration the availability of the post-conviction writ 
in such circumstances. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
directs the district judge to decide the merits of Palmore's 
Fourth Amendment claims. In view of this Court's holding in 
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1 969 ), neither of the 
parties seriously briefed or argued before the Court of Appeals 
the issue of whether the post-conviction writ will lie in the 
circumstances of Palrnoreis case, and that court relied solely 
. "· on Kaufman when it directed the District Court to proceed to a 
determination of the Fourth An'.2ndment issues involved. After 
this Court had granted the petition for writ of certiorari in 
this case, it handed down its decision in Stone v. Powell and 
further explicated the principles announced in Kaufman and which 
govern disposition of post-conviction claims for relief involving 
Fourth Amendment claims. In these circumstances, and after 
consultation with members of the Solicitor General's staff , we 
advised the Government and your office that Palmore would not 
oppose the pending motion to vacate and remand for further 
consideration. We did so in the belief that it was altogether 
Michael Rodak, Jr., Esquire - 2 - October 13, 1976 
appropriate to afford the United States Court of Appeals an 
opportunity to consider in the first instance a potentially 
dispositive issue which it had not considered seriously 
debatable when the appeal was decided prior to issuance of this 
Court's Stone decision. 





Frank F. Flegaff 
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
To: Justice Powell Date: 12/10/76 
From: Tyler Baker 
Re: Swain v. Pressley, No 75-811 
~ ~/~w.•1c'-.ly~(;-; 
Both because the briefs in this case are quite good and because 
statutory construction arguments are difficult to compress, this 
memo will lay out the basic framework of the two arguments, Xg«X 
augmenting that framework with appropriate citations to the briefs 
and my reactions. 
At this stage in the litigation this case llX presents a problem 
f t . h . . ,.l _ . h o statu ;;!J _:;PStru:!,1on; t e constitution issue concerning t e 
Suspension Clause is present only to the extent that it informs the 
approach to the statutory construction. At issue Dis 23 D.C. Code 
llO(g), which provides as follows: -- "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion 
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the 
Superior Court or bfi anr Federal or State court if it ap¥ears 
that the applicantasailed to make a motion for relie under 
this section or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, 
unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is XX inadequate 
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 
(Emphasis Xlill added.) 
I 
The SG relies on the plain meaning of the words emphasized above. 
Despite the apparently unambiguous meaning of the words, the SG does 
h 4.rtyf 1 . 1 · h · · · not argue t atAre erence to egis ative istory is incorrect. He does 
argue that CADC XKK asked the wrong questions in conducting the , 
examination of the legislative history. The SG argues that XX CADC 
was incorrect to read the second phrase of §llO(g) out of the statute 
because of silence or XM.X ambiguity in the legislative history. SG's 
I 
Brief, at 29. The SG contends that the appropriate approach in XMKX 
this case is as follows: 
"[The Court should not ask] whether the pertinent extrinsic 
materials demonstrate that 'Congress clearly intended' (Pet. App. 
27a) the full jurisdictional consequences of Section ll0(g), 
but rather whether the legislative history is so manifestly in-
consistent~ with the legislation itself as to warrant the 
extraordinary conclusion that XXX giving effect to the second 
clause of that section would negate rather XXX than promote 
the Congressional will." SG's Brief, at 30. 
The SG recognizes that it is appropriate to construe legislation so 
as to avoid constitution questions, but argues that the construction 
used to avoid the problem must be "fairly possible." SG's Brief at 
31. 
with 
The SG findsHX in the legislative history no inconsistency/HliX~K l his suggested reading of the statute. The disputed section is part 
of a general 1970 reform of them D.C. court system designed to increase 
a total transfer of the efficiency of the system. There was XHXlili 
to_ t"-t.. f\eVJ foe.a.I C.01.tt'f-S , - -------------
1::._cal J urisdic '0-ot;f and fhe ro1 e of § 110 is to insulate the Article 
III courts from collateral involvement in such local criminal litigation 
--- ... ,,,,,....__ ~ ¾la 
in duplication of the collateral proceedings in the Superior Court. 
Although Congress did analogize the new D.C. courts to the state systems, 
the analogy is not perfect. The local judges, while lacking Article 
J.or- IS yUA.r f-~v-~S. 
III status, are nominated by the President and confirmed by the SenateA 
I 
The SG draws support from the fact that §110 is patterned on 28 U.S.C. 
§2255. Section 2255 is clearly not only an exhaustion of remedies _......., 
provision; rather, it provides XMM a complete, self-contained substitute 
for habeas corpus. The SG UXK asks why Congress would use §2255 as 
a model for a law which, if resps are correct, was intended to have such 
, w,·t-~ 
a different effect from §2255. The SG also points out, -j:0.Agreat effect, 
[ that §2255 ~K~HKX requires that persons convicted by Article Ia 
. W\A.~e t-i\eir c.o IIJ-e.ro.l tA...tl~jt .s by ~ot ":i" 
MX territorial courtsA+ I I hr to those courts. llKl:IX. Although 
that problem has not apparently been litigated on a constitutional 
basis, it raises the same question as ~MKDM raised here. The absence 
rnf :IDqiH debate aboutXKlili~J §110 may be explained by the 
fact that Congress presumed it constitutional because of the previous 
similar treatment of territorial courts. XKK SG's Brief, at 48 and 
n. 27. The Xi SG MlilXXXMXKIM also points out KM« that under the CADC 
interpretation, habeas petitions may be filed in the MtKK~XK districts 
in which persons convicted in the D.C. courts are confined. One of 
,.lu... c..ko.tl t.~.,1e j 
the purposes of §2255 was to channel Ab)." 1 s XUX~Qk through 
the courts of conviction, and the same point applies here •• Finally, 
the SG distinguishes those cases relied upon by resps wherfhe KMHXX 
Court interpreted statutes so as to avoid the question of the Suspension 
Clause. The cases either involved a greater infringement on KX habeas 
corpus or Kk~X~~ less explicit statutory provisions. See SG's Brief, 
at 49-52. 
The SG also goes into considerable detail about the XfilfKXIlfIKJX~X 
A.9rf.L$ 
Xlili underlying constitutionalijX question. He~m::;1;11aa. with Judge Robb's 
dissent in essence, arguing that the problem here is answered ~;----~e 
by Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, in which the Court held that 
there was no problem in being convicted in the E~ District by a 
non-Article III judge. Assuming that the fact that non-Article III 
judges would hear the §110 motions, and assuming that the lack of 
. f h . d ' d 1 1 · 
11
d • • • 
11 
protection o sue JU ges tenure an sa ary resu ts in a iminution 
of the right of HX habeas corpus, the SG argues that there is still no 
It • II suspension. SG's XX~K Brief, at 59. Using history, the SG argues that 
there would 
back to its 
be no constitutional problem if habeas 
Ii ~;tJ-10 t\ to ! v.e.s+,·of\.i. 
original~ jurisdictionaII\ I 1; 811 
corpus were pared 
He notes that this 
case:KX does not involve that problem because the scope of issues that 
can be raised HMK~ under §110 covers all of present-day habeas corpus. 
:J 
The equal protection argument is XKKX answered by the assertion that 
there is not ~Q right to litigate in XHX any particular tribunal. 
Resps ~X rely on the arguments used by CADC. They would read 
§ll0(g) as nothing more than an exhaustion provision. Under their 
----~ ,.., - -- '---==-=-= .............__ ~ 
theory the purpose of the XKKXX statuteKX was to codify a previously 
vague, common law ~~XKXXK power of collateral review. Responding 
to the SG's argument, resps admit that improving efficiency was a 
motivating factor in the 1970 reform, but X~Wli argue that there 
is not evidence that Congress XHMtiMXXfilUQ!XHXK:Kfilf thought of collateral 
attack as being part of the problem of backlog. Resps' Brief, at 18 
n. 15. Resps point to the limited legislative history in which the 
only point that is clearly made is a reference to~ the previously 
unsettled, IKMlflfKK:KX inherent~ power of review. They relj on the 
absence of statements recognizing the effect of the statute that is 
now advanced by the SG, putting XMK~ this absence of reaction in 
comparision to strong reactions to other provisions contemplating 
a cut-back in habeas corpus. Resps Brief, at 23 n.21. Resps rely 
heavily on the analogy to the %KMX relationship that exists between 
federal and state courts, drawing on the analogy to those systems in 
the discussions of the 1970 reform of the District court system. 
From the pattern of the statute as a wholeJthey see an intent by EMM~K 
oj, Co&A rs<., th.,.. ,~..t.."siu,. • ;"<.' "''t' ,l_ ~t. r-u"'-t ~o l\al,eu '"' Jd,,. .. , (otert. 
Congress to emulate that relationship for the District.A XMX In this 
same vein, they argue that there were no amendments here to the 
basic~ jurisdictional provisions of Title 28. Resps answer the 
argument about habeas petitions being brought in districts in which 
D.C. prisoners are confined, by referring to an understanding that such 
cases will be X~ transferred }IX back to the D.C. for action. 
Resps spend considerably XX less IMX~X energy on the underlying 
constitutional ijHKK question; for purposes of interpretation of the 
statute there can be no doubt that there is a problem which might 
JKX justify an interpretation XH which KDMIK eliminates the need 
to address the question. Resps argue that the Article III protections 
are important enoughXX to justify a conclusion that this statute 
would amount to a suspensiion. They argue, without much force, that 
the local D.C. judges are X%XIKJ likely to be more responsive to 
the parochial concerns of their locality. Resps' RI~K Brief, at 49. 
Resps do not have much of an answer to the SG's point about this 
same problem existing for §2255 and territorial courts. They state 
that the Suspension Clause applies to current HKifil!Hli unincorporated 
liX ter~itortes only by legislative grace, so the full force of the 
S&-l&~~StOt'\ LIA.~~~ 
A pfoblem cannot arise. Resps' Brief, at 54 n. 53 
Discussion: 
Resps have IMK«ll~ identified some problems. I certainly would 
have expected more discussion of the effect claimed by the SG than 
there is. There is a X~XMll traditionXX of avoiding interpretations 
that require addressing the Suspension Clause. But, the statutory 
language here is plain. At most the X~I legislative history fails to 
'- .... -
KH support positively the apparent effect oft-he language of the statute. 
I do not see any inconsistency, and the fact that §2255 does seem to 
have this same effect for territorial courts is important. Despite the 
fact that 8 good judges reached the result, I do not think that this 
legislative history is nearly strong enough to justify t«i ignoring the 
language of the statute. 
I do not think that the Court should decide the constitutional 
question. I would remand so that the Court will have a good, full -consideration below HK~ on which to draw. I tend, however, to agree 
with XH~XHg Judge Robb that the first Palmore is at least very 
s 
of the result here. The ~~X District of Columbia is sui generis 
t"e.. 
in many respects. I do not see t~atAdifference in the Article III 
protections in this context a HX~\ufficient to justify the conclusion 
thatXHM habeas has been suspended by this statute. ~1:=21:z:z:;3::a:s:m:=s~, 
\ - -----·------ ----•------ - - ------- - - ---- --- - ~- ------- ---- •--
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Jasper C .. Pressley. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
'[March -, 1977] 
MR, JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the opinion of the Court. In view, however, of 
the concurrence filed today by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,, I write 
merely to make clear that I do not read Part II of the Court's 
opinion as being incompatible with the views I have expressed 
previously with respect to the nature ancl scope of habeas 
corpus. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
(1973) (POWELL, J. , concurring). 
.( 




. ' ,., .. 
. . 





THE C . .T . "\Y . .T. B. P . S. B . TI. "\Y. T . :\I. H . A. B. L. F. P. 11·. H. TI. .T. P. S. 
1/26/77 
~~ l(JS ~Jff ~~fs ~~/15 ~cc;) ~r5 j ~c9 3_{)~ 
~71 :1 /t7?'7 $ j,, /-,7 :JI I 1,/-,? ~1,1./,; :, I/(,/-,-, 3/1/ /1? .3 J1r/7) 3/l'/77 
l~~ ~t! y.,« /J .J~ ----.- r. 
( /10/,? :J ;,,;,., 
I tJ~ r-AJ.4# :1-.-1 !rrd 3 /1p/7-, , . 
:J/,1/77 :J/1t,/17 
t(~ ~ 
'J /, i/1? 
r 
75-811 Swain v. P '""essley 
